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Abstract
Africa is a region of the world that has been plagued by conflict for decades. Specific
civil wars in the 1990s gained worldwide attention due to the perceived source of funding
for rebel groups to continue the bloodshed: diamonds. As civil society organizations and
journalists exposed the role of diamonds and the diamond industry, a link between
diamonds and conflict also emerged in the scholarly literature regarding the “resource
curse.” In response, policymakers created the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
an institution designed to address the problem of conflict diamonds and to clean up the
diamond industry. While many critics have been quick the exploit the limitations of the
institution, there has been relatively no academic work empirically evaluating if the
Kimberley Process is effectively reducing conflict outcomes. This thesis seeks to
analytically assess whether the institution is actually proving to be an obstacle for the
onset and duration of civil war. Using logit regression and a Weibull duration model, this
study finds that while the Kimberley Process does not significantly effect the onset of
civil war, it does decrease the length of wars for the diamond producing states it was
designed to alleviate conflict in.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

While diamonds are often considered to be a “girl’s best friend”, many scholars and
policymakers have thought it more accurate to alter this cliché and instead claim that
diamonds are a “rebel’s best friend.” These precious gemstones that are commonly
considered a luxurious symbol of love, marriage, and commitment in modern society are
projecting a drastically different image in the African countries where they are mined.
Diamond mining in a number of states has become an avenue for rebel groups to finance
their armed conflicts and initiate civil wars through the looting and selling of contraband
gems. Additionally, diamonds create incentives for rebels to capture and control territory
that is diamond-rich. For several decades, scholars have debated the “resource curse” and
the adverse effects natural resources have on economic growth (Auty 1990; Gelb 1988;
Sachs and Warner 1997), autocratic political regimes (Bellin 2004; Karl 1997; Ross
2001), and conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2001a).
While oil has often been examined as the causal variable for these three phenomena,
diamonds have also emerged as a common factor between a number of African states that
have been ravaged by civil wars.
As particularly bloody conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone gained worldwide
attention in the 1990s, the destructive role of diamonds became even more exposed.
Scholars further confirmed the vast media attention with academic studies validating the
negative link between diamonds and civil war (Le Billon 2001b; Samset 2002; Smilie,
Gbrerie, and Hazelton 2000). This prompted the international community to discuss ways
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of better regulating the diamond trade to ensure that consumers would not be indirectly
funding violent rebel groups and ending up with blood (diamonds) on their hands, quite
literally. The United Nations endorsed the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme, a voluntary international institution designed to guarantee that diamonds mined
in conflict-stricken areas were not illicitly entering the market, and indirectly funding
civil wars.
The Kimberley Process first went into effect in 2003 with a unique soft-law
structure and members formally agreeing to only engage in diamond trade with other
member states. The Kimberley Process now includes 81 countries that account for 99.8%
of the world’s total diamond production (Kimberley Process 2015). The organization also
boasts that less than one percent of diamonds on the market can be considered conflict
diamonds, as opposed to approximately four percent in the late 1990s (Wright 2004,
702). Additionally, the civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone have ended and no other
perceptible diamond-driven conflicts have emerged in recent years.
Despite these accomplishments that can at least be acknowledged on face value,
the Kimberley Process has not been without criticism from journalists, social groups, and
legal scholars. Yet while news stories describing illicit diamonds crossing borders or
forged Kimberley Process certificates have frequently emerged, there has been very little
empirical research by the academic community regarding whether or not the Kimberley
Process is actually achieving what it set out to do—reduce the number of conflict
diamonds making their way onto the market and providing funding for the bloody and
violent civil wars that had been infamous at the close of the 20th century.
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This research seeks to address two important issues: the role that diamonds play
in civil war outcomes and also the role that the Kimberley Process has played since 2003,
specifically asking the question, “Does the Kimberley Process prove to be an obstacle for
the onset of civil wars as well as their duration?” If the organization is functioning as it
has been designed, it can generally be hypothesized that diamond producing states with
the Kimberley Process in place should be less likely to experience civil wars and also
have shorter conflicts when they do break out. The analysis in this study uses statistical
modeling to test this hypothesis and finds that while the impact of diamonds on conflict
may be less conclusive than previous research has shown, the Kimberley Process does
significantly decrease the length of civil war for diamond producing countries. Despite
the many criticisms that the organization has faced, these results give some quantitative
support for the successes that it has claimed credit for.
Great attention and resources by the international community have been devoted
to the Kimberley Process, and it is worth empirically examining how effective it has been
at decreasing civil wars and conflict. Scholarly attention to the role that resources play on
developing countries has spanned decades, with much particular focus on diamonds and
civil war. This study will build upon this prior academic work, introducing a new
variable, the Kimberley Process, to examine the determinants of both civil war onset and
duration. The analysis particularly focuses on conflict outcomes in sub-Saharan African
and the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process in this specific region. While the
institution seeks to regulate trade for all states involved in the diamond industry, it was
largely created as a result of the “conflict diamonds” emerging from this area of Africa
(Bieri 2010). It is a region that has been plagued by conflict, with research showing the
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mean duration of civil wars to last 13.1 years (as opposed to an 8.8 year mean worldwide)
and wars involving rebel access to contraband goods lasting significantly longer (Fearon
2004). Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa includes 12 of the world’s 18 main diamond
producing states, with mining for these gemstones arguably occurring in some of the
poorest and most unstable states in the world (Olsson 2007). If an institution created to
alleviate conflict outcomes in this war-stricken region is proving successful, the
implications for both political scientists and policymakers alike will be important for
future research and peacekeeping efforts. This study is a significant contribution to the
existing literature for these reasons, finding support for the effectiveness of the
Kimberley Process.
This thesis will proceed as follows:
Chapter 2 will review the literature regarding the resource curse, with specific
attention given to the research concerning resource abundance and conflict. Focus will
also be placed on diamonds, especially diamonds that are considered “lootable”. A
review of the scholarship connecting diamonds and civil war will be followed by a brief
substantive overview of the “blood diamond” wars in the 1990s and the creation of the
Kimberley Process as an institution to reduce these conflicts. The criticisms and
evaluations of the Kimberley Process found both in journalistic and scholarly literature
are included, showing evidence for a lack of empirical analysis regarding its
effectiveness.
Chapter 3 will introduce the logit and duration models used to test the influence of
the Kimberley Process, explaining why these methods are best suited for the analysis. A
brief discussion of the main explanatory variables as well as control variables details the
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sources for the data, why they are chosen, and any data issues. Ten specific hypotheses
are listed to examine the effects of diamonds and the Kimberley Process on the onset and
duration of civil war.
The results presented in Chapter 4 indicate that while the Kimberley Process does
not have any significant effect on civil war onset, it does decrease conflict duration in
diamond producing states. Interestingly, diamonds do not significantly impact civil war
onset or duration in these models, posing questions for the existing scholarship
identifying this relationship.
Chapter 5 will conclude with a discussion of the substantive implications for the
results of the analysis, highlighting other mechanisms that may be impacting conflict
outcomes. The limitations of this study are noted, as well as suggestions for further
research to understand the roles that diamonds and the Kimberley Process play in civil
war.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

The harmful effects that resource abundance can have on developing states has
been documented in scholarly literature for several decades, many years before the
perceived “blood diamond” conflicts gained worldwide attention in the 1990s. As these
civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa caused great concern for international peacekeeping
bodies as well as the diamond industry, they also prompted a series of studies empirically
analyzing the impact diamonds have on conflict outcomes. With both policymakers and
scholars largely confirming the negative link, the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme was created as an institution designed to address the problem. A careful
examination of the research by the scholarly, journalistic, and policymaking communities
demonstrates how worries over this “resource curse” led to the creation of an institution
designed to alleviate the devastating effects diamond wealth was having on a number of
developing states and whether it can be considered an effective solution.
“The Resource Curse”: Early and Foundational Research
Concerns over a “resource curse” began arising in the economic development
literature as early as the 1950s, with scholars in the subsequent decades noting the
remarkably slow growth rates for resource-rich countries as opposed to higher growth
rates for states with little natural resources (Baldwin 1966; Hirschman 1958; Levin 1960;
Nurske 1958; Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). However, Gelb (1988) and Auty (1990) are
largely credited as the first contemporary scholars to analyze the resource curse. Both use
a more systematic and empirical method to demonstrate that over time, countries with
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greater oil and mineral resources were not able to use this wealth to boost their
economies. In fact, these countries had lower levels of economic growth than countries
without natural resources.
Building upon the foundation laid by Gelb and Auty, Sachs and Warner (1997)
brought forth what is considered the most comprehensive quantitative study on the slow
growth aspect of the resource curse. These scholars examine a sample of 95 developing
countries over a 20-year period using regression analysis to measure the impact of
mineral and other resource exports on GDP growth. States with a high ratio of natural
resource exports to GDP in 1970 had abnormally slow growth rates between 1971 and
1990. Natural resource exports continued to have a statistically significant negative effect
on GDP even after controlling for trade policy, investment rates, region, bureaucratic
efficiency, terms-of-trade volatility, and income distributions. This research has been
followed up by a series of other cross-country studies using growth regressions that
largely confirm the negative link (Busby et al. 2004; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006;
Sachs and Warner 1999) and has also been complemented by many well-designed case
studies likewise supporting the hypothesis that an abundance of resources may negatively
impact development (Karl 1997; Ross 1999, 2001).
The literature in subsequent years evolved as scholars noted that resource-rich
countries not only experienced a lack of economic growth, but also were more likely to
have autocratic political regimes (Bellin 2004; Karl 1997; Ross 2001) and experience
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2001), the main focus of this research. These three
outcomes surely can affect one another, creating an element of simultaneous causality
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among them. It is important that this is noted, as much of the literature focuses on just
one of the three aspects of the resource curse and there are presumably mechanisms at
work that overlap between them. While this research focuses on the negative effect
resources (specifically diamonds) have on conflict, the literature does suggest the
potential for an overlap between these other two aspects in the theories that explain
causation.
Increased Risk of Civil War
The harmful effect natural resources have on an increased risk of civil war and
conflict is the aspect of the resource curse that is often referred to when explaining the
connection between diamond wealth and the occurrence of civil wars in sub-Saharan
Africa. As scholars have identified the link between resources and civil war, they have
posited a number of different theories that explain the causation. The bulk of the
literature has divided into two dominant explanations. The first argues that where there
are easily accessible resources, rebel groups will have incentive to capture and control
territory in a state. The second argues that resource dependence leads to rent seeking and
corruption, creating a weak state with weak institutions. The state then does not have the
capacity to effectively terminate insurrections and civil wars.
The first causal explanation regarding rebel groups capturing resource-rich
territory is built upon some of the contemporary civil war literature that examines the
economic causes of conflict (Azam 1995; Grossman 1995; Hirshleifer 1987). This
research takes on a very rational choice tone with the theoretical framework focusing on
the actors involved in a civil war, their preferences, and the actions that are taken to
achieve these ends. In simple terms, a civil war occurs in a state if the incentive for a
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rebellion is sufficiently large enough relative to the costs (Collier and Hoeffler 1998,
563). The incentive for this rebellion is the product of probability of victory and its
consequences. This probability then depends on the ability of a government to defend
itself, bringing economic resources into the equation. Resources here are not limited to
just natural resources, but any resources used for a state to defend itself in a civil war or a
rebel group to incite one. Resources provide the state with a greater probability of victory
in war, but also create greater incentives for rebels to engage in insurrection. All
participating actors weigh both of these potential costs and benefits before engaging in
conflict (Grossman 1999; p. 269).
Rebel groups are faced with a higher cost than the state when engaging in civil
war. This is partly due to the opportunity cost of rebel labor and the disturbance in
economic activity caused by the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 565). For states with
a higher per capita income, both costs would increase. Quite simply, higher income
populations have more to lose during a rebellion than lower income populations. These
costs would also increase with the duration of the conflict. As rational actors, rebels are
faced with the choice of remaining peaceful or fighting a war with a specific probability
of success and an expected duration which is necessary to achieve the desired outcome
(secession or capture of the state). Because the benefits of rebellion will differ according
to each state and each group, these rebel groups will also differ in their willingness to
accept the costs related to the differing projected durations (Grossman 1995, 191).
Building upon this earlier model of civil war, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) analyze
the “greed” dimension of the resource curse that concerns opportunistic rebels capturing
resource-rich territory. They likewise posit that natural resources will create large enough
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incentives for rebels to engage in insurrection. Using probit and tobit regressions for a
dataset containing state-level observations for 98 countries between the years 1960 and
1992, Collier and Hoeffler find that the possession of natural resources (measured as a
ratio of primary commodity export revenues to GDP) initially increases the risk and
duration of civil war for their model. Higher income per capita in contrast reduces the
risk and duration of civil war. The authors go on to explain that where there is higher
economic stability, rebel actors have more to lose as they weigh the costs and benefits of
rebellion. Governments in these economies also have more resources to defend the state
and are less likely to experience civil war. Natural resources, however, provide an
incentive for rebel groups to engage in civil war should they succeed. They point to the
significance of their primary commodity exports variable as well as GDP per capita as
evidence for their theory. Similarly, Herbst (2000) notes that resources play a large role
for rebel leaders in assessing the opportunity costs of insurrection, likewise finding that
the obstacles to collective action are smaller when there are more natural resources.
Phillip Le Billon (2001a) introduces two other mechanisms that further explain
and clarify Collier and Hoeffler’s greed concept: motivation and financing. In his
qualitative analysis, he observes that areas rich with natural resources are usually very
concentrated geographically, and this provides motivation for rebel leaders to stake out
and gain control over certain areas in a state. Fights over these territorial areas could
result and thus lead to civil war. The financing mechanism in his theory suggests that
trade gains from these natural resources can fund the startup costs, purchase of weapons,
etc. for rebel groups engaging in civil war. Natural resources are seen as a financial
incentive that helps decrease the costs of civil war for rebel groups.
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A number of other studies have also found support for civil war as being greeddriven (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Collier, Hoeffler,
and Söderbom 2004; Lujala 2010) rather than resulting from grievances in the population
against the state, another longstanding explanation (Gurr 1970, 2000). In 2004 Collier
and Hoeffler once again find stronger support for civil wars as being driven by greedy
rebels, with their primary commodity exports variable generating high predictability of
civil war outcomes. Male secondary education enrollment, per capita income, and the
growth rate all statistically reduce the risk of conflict, lending support to the idea that
rebels facing higher opportunity costs will be less likely to succeed. Collier and Hoeffler
use inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, religious fractionalization, and ethnic
dominance as proxy variables to examine if there is evidence for rebellion as being
grievance-driven. Only ethnic dominance (one ethnic group being a majority) had
significant adverse effects, allowing them to once again make the case for rebellion as
being greed-driven (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
Fearon and Laitin (2003) are commonly regarded as the primary scholars to
introduce the second main theoretical connection between resource abundance and civil
war, with their analysis finding support for a weak state mechanism. They argue that
resource dependence will generally result in rent seeking and corruption creating weak
central governments. In these ineffective states, the likelihood of conflict increases
because of their inability to manage counterinsurgency at the local level. States that are
financially, politically, and organizationally weak render insurgency more feasible for
rebel groups due to incompetent local policing or weak and corrupt counterinsurgency
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practices (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75-76).1 To measure state strength, they include per
capita income in their analysis as a proxy variable and find that higher levels reduce the
risk of civil war. Additionally, they find larger populations, political instability, being a
new state, and an oil exporter to increase the likelihood of civil war. They likewise do not
find support for grievances being a cause of civil war with indicators such as ethnic or
religious diversity, lack of democracy, and economic inequality resulting in insignificant
results. Fearon and Laitin also do not find support for Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 2004)
argument that resources are a cause of greed-based rebellion, with the primary
commodity exports variable lacking statistical significance in their analysis. Confirming
this study, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005) also find
greater support for a weak state mechanism causing civil war than the greedy rebels
dimension. In a comparative study of 13 civil wars, Ross (2004b) further does not find
evidence of wars being greed or grievance driven; yet he does not test the weak-states
mechanism.
While the greed-driven rebellion and state-capacity mechanisms appear to be at
odds with each other, de Soysa and Neumayer (2007) argue that they can in fact be
complementary. A strong state will be able to deter most rebel looting; the motive might
yet exist while the opportunity for success does not. If cases exist where resource
abundance and wealth does not cause corruption and state weakness, the state should be
able to use resource rents to constrain rebels and circumvent conflict. They find that
energy rents slightly increase the risk of minor armed conflict, but not major civil war
onset, with mineral rents having no effect. Generally, their study lends more support for
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This theory hearkens back to the slow-growth and autocratic regime aspects of the resource curse,
with causal mechanisms in these fields also explaining the weak states.
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the state capacity mechanism, but does not rule out the potential for greed-driven civil
war when the state is weak and cannot deter it.
Snyder (2006) further argues that natural resources may not necessarily lead to
conflict and disorder. He maintains that outcomes can vary depending upon the actions of
rulers and private economic actors, also when taking into consideration the institutions of
resource extraction. If rulers are able to implement extraction methods that give them
tight control over natural resources, these incomes can help maintain the order in a state.
Natural resources may actually have a stabilizing effect for states that are able to control
the institutions of extraction, such as Botswana’s state-owned mining companies.
However, the collapse or absence of institutions of extraction can also lead to instability
in two ways, by causing a financial crisis that threatens state failure and by making it
easier for rebel groups to organize and claim control over resource wealth.
According to Snyder, the type of resource including how it is extracted, whether
the means of doing so are state-owned or privately controlled, and how susceptible it is to
looting matters for conflict outcomes. Further research began to examine these
characteristics and more specifically differentiate the effects that different types of
resources have on conflict. The previous general measure of primary commodity exports
began to be replaced by specific resource types such as oil (Aslaksen 2010; de Soysa and
Neumayer 2007; Lujala 2010), forest resources (Buhaug and Rød 2006; Rustad et al.
2007), and the main focus of this study—diamonds.
Diamonds as Lootable Resources
In order for scholars to better understand the causation between resources and
civil war, this more nuanced look at natural resources became necessary. Under the
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greed-driven rebellion theory, the resources under consideration must actually be
accessible to the rebel leaders for Le Billon’s (2001a) motivation and financing
mechanisms to hold true. Oil requires expensive machinery and investment before the
financial gains of it can actually be realized. This is also the case for timber and many
types of mining. Diamonds, however, often require little to no infrastructure and simple,
unsophisticated methods for excavation. Essentially, they could be classified as highly
“lootable.” A resource that can be considered lootable is one that is a high value good
with low economic barrier to entry. Some natural resources therefore can be considered
lootable while others are non-lootable. As mentioned above, oil, timber, and other heavymachinery mining would thus be classified as non-lootable natural resources with some
research arguing that resources such as these actually positively affect regime stability
and peace (Basdeau and Lay 2009; Smith 2004; Thies 2010). Diamonds, however, can be
a resource that is extremely lootable and therefore highly beneficial to rebel actors
because of the low economic barriers to entry. Olsson (2007, 286) even goes as far to
state that diamonds are the ideal reward for potential predators due to their “high value
per carat, flexible practical size and scale of extraction, their indestructability, their
tradability all over the world, and the difficulty with which their place of origin can be
established.”
While some scholars have found support for a general measure of overall
diamond production significantly increasing civil war outcomes (Humphreys 2005;
Olsson 2007), many have extended the concept of lootable vs. non-lootable resources
even further by paying specific attention to the type of diamonds and diamond mining
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occurring in a state. When understanding some basic diamond geology, it is evident that
some diamonds can be considered lootable while others are not.
Diamond mining methods fall into two separate categories: alluvial and kimberlite
mining. Alluvial mining and alluvial (secondary) diamonds are removed from their
primary source by natural erosion over millions of years and eventually deposited in a
new environment such as an ocean floor, riverbed, shoreline, or other nearby areas.
Kimberlite mining extracts primary diamonds at their original source: kimberlite beds
found under the Earth’s crust. Kimberlite mining requires advanced technology and
machinery, and is capital-intensive. Alluvial mining, on the other hand, is done through
artisanal methods and recovered through sand, gravel, or clay by digging with tools
requiring little sophistication or investment: human labor, shovels, sieves, etc.
Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) are some of the first scholars to
quantitatively examine the effects of primary (kimberlite) and secondary (alluvial)
diamonds. They use regression models and data from 53 diamond producing countries
from 1945 to 1999 and find that most diamond-rich countries experience conflict.
However, when they introduce the diamond variables into standard civil war models, the
results are a little more mixed. They find that secondary or alluvial diamonds increase the
risk of civil war, especially in states with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization.
Primary or kimberlite diamonds in turn actually have the opposite effect: making civil
war less likely. Similar results by Ross (2006) and Østby, Nordås, and Rød (2009) show
that secondary diamond deposits significantly increase the likelihood of civil war onset,
with Ross noting, however, that there is no impact on conflict duration. This was disputed
by Lujala (2009, 2010; see also Buhaug and Lujala 2005) who finds that the duration and
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intensity of a conflict increases when secondary and lootable diamonds are found within
the conflict zone.
A number of qualitative case studies have also found support for the role lootable
resources play in conflict outcomes, with specific attention given to the bloody civil wars
witnessed in Africa (Keen 2005; Le Billon 2001b; Samset 2002; Smilie, Gbrerie, and
Hazelton 2000). Studying diamond-rich states in sub-Saharan Africa, Olsson (2006) finds
that diamonds do largely correlate with economic underdevelopment and civil war.
However, he does note that different outcomes on these variables across his cases are due
to the type of mining that is being done in each state, with alluvial mining leading to
conflict outcomes such as the civil wars in Angola, DRC, and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.
Snyder and Bhavani (2005) also consider the differences in lootable vs. non-lootable
resources. Through a small-N analysis looking at the cases of Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone, they determine that the ability of rulers to achieve political order depends on the
availability of non-lootable resources, the mode of extraction of the lootable resources,
and patterns of state spending. While their study does not differentiate on the types of
diamond mining, the underlying concepts at work are extremely similar. Resources that
are lootable will provide the motivation for rebel leaders to capture a geographic area and
then be able to use that as an economic incentive to lessen the costs associated with
rebellion.
Shortcomings in the Literature
Although there is an abundance of literature supporting the theory that diamonds
(especially lootable diamonds) exacerbate conflict outcomes, there is nearly as much
research devoted to debunking, or at least questioning the “myth” of the resource curse
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regarding resources and civil war (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Smith 2004; Sorens
2011). Even studies that generally agree upon the underlying theory vastly differ in how
to capture the relationship. No agreed-upon statistical conflict model exists, and there are
numerous shortcomings and differences in the literature. Koubi et al. (2014) detail some
of the deficiencies they find in the existing scholarly work, noting first that studies differ
in how they measure civil war and conflict. Not only do the commonly used datasets
differ in operationally defining civil war (for example with the Correlates of War project
using 1,000 or more battle-deaths as the threshold necessary for civil war as opposed to
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset that has a lower threshold of only 25 battledeaths in a year), but studies also use different measures. Civil war is sometimes used in
the form of onset (Basdeau and Lay 2009; Lujala 2010; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009),
duration (Lujala 2009), severity (Sorens 2011), or even recurrence (Rustad and
Binningsbø 2012). While there certainly is merit to understand these different aspects of
civil war and conflict, it does become more difficult to form a generally agreed-upon
quantitative model.
Koubi et al. (2014) also note the differences regarding the literature’s sample
coverage of both space and time. Some scholars use worldwide data (Humphreys 2005;
Ross 2006; Lujala 2009, 2010), with others focusing on specific regions (Østby, Nordås,
and Rød 2009) or even single countries (Bellows and Miguel 2009). Furthermore, the
time span differs greatly with some studies 10 to 20 years (Fjelde 2009; Bellows and
Miguel 2009) with others analyzing 40 or more years (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009;
Thies 2010; Sorens 2011).
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There are also large differences in how scholars measure resource abundance and
dependence. Some studies use dichotomous variables to indicate whether or not a country
has natural resources such as oil or diamonds, or specifically primary vs. secondary
diamonds (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009; Snyder and Bhavani 2005; Sorens 2011). Other
scholars rely on the export value of natural resources and relate this to the size of the
economy or total exports (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Ross 2004a), with others
creating a dummy variable for resources that reach above a certain threshold point
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Still, other scholars use measures of resource production as a
ratio of GDP or population (Basdeau and Lay 2009; Fjelde 2009) while a number of
others use total value or rents from resource production (de Soysa and Neumayer 2007;
Humphreys 2005).
Finally, data on natural resource production and wealth used in earlier studies
have come to be regarded as rather low quality (Humphreys 2005). The quality of this
information has greatly improved in recent years with the creation of new datasets on
diamond deposits and mine production as well as oil and gas reserve locations (de Soysa
and Neumayer 2007; Flöter, Lujala, and Rød 2005; Gilmore et al. 2005; Lujala, Rød, and
Thieme 2007; Østby et al. 2011; Sorens 2011; Thieme, Rød, and Lujala 2007).
“Blood Diamonds” and The Kimberley Process for Diamond Certification
Despite the lack of total consensus on a model capturing the impact diamonds
play in conflict outcomes, public awareness of the association became heightened in the
late 1990s as “blood diamonds” were viewed as a main culprit for the civil wars ravaging
Angola and Sierra Leone at the time, among other African conflicts. After independence
in 1975, Angola had experienced prolonged civil war, stemming from existing ethnic and
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social tensions, but intensified through the clashes between the two main colonial
liberation movements, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). In the mid-1990s the
conflict continued, despite a lack of support from Western powers and the local
population. A number of social groups and eventually the United Nations pointed to
UNITA’s persistence as a result of its control over diamond-rich land. It has been
estimated that between 1992 and 1998, UNITA received a minimum of US$3.72 billion
in diamond revenues while controlling 90 percent of the country’s diamond reserves
(Gooch and Yearsley 1998). Stories also emerged of Angolan diamonds being illicitly
funneled into Zaire, where stockholders in the De Beers diamond corporation collected
them in exchange for military equipment and arms originating from Eastern Europe
(Fowler 2000).
Similar to Angola, Sierra Leone encountered decades of political turmoil,
corruption, mismanagement and electoral violence after gaining independence in 1961.
Years of this instability led to a weak civil society, the collapse of the education system,
and an entire generation of dissatisfied youth by the 1980s and 1990s. These young men
were particularly attracted to the message of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). With
aid from the special forces of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), the RUF attempted to overthrow the Joseph Momoh government. Diamonds had
long been considered a source contributing to the widespread government corruption
since their discovery in the 1930s, and this in turn intensified the grievances of the people
against the ruling elite. However, the role played by diamonds in the Sierra Leone civil
war became even more prominent as RUF rebels primarily took control of territory in and
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around the diamond districts, resulting in brutal violence including the rape, murder, and
mutilation of local civilians in order to control and work the mines. RUF rebels were able
to use diamond incomes to arm themselves and purchase additional weapons and
ammunition from neighboring Liberia and Guinea. Diamonds were regarded as a
significant resource in the sustained conflict which after 11 years claimed an estimated
75,000 lives, left 500,000 Sierra Leoneans as refugees, and displaced nearly half of the
country’s 4.5 million people (Tamm 2002).
The destructive wars in both Angola and Sierra Leone drew the attention of
several human rights organizations including the well known Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch. However, it was Global Witness, a small NGO at the time, which
gained the attention of the worldwide mainstream media with its 1998 report that shed
unpleasant light on diamond firms’ dealings with UNITA rebel leaders in Angola and
also on De Beers’ dealings with the notoriously corrupt government-owned enterprises in
the country (Gooch and Yearsley 1998). In 2000, Partnership Africa Canada (PAC)
published an equally disagreeable report about the illicit diamond trade in Sierra Leone
(Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000). Through the efforts of Global Witness and PAC,
conflict diamonds began to gain even greater attention. Stories began to emerge in outlets
such as the BBC, the New York Times, and the Washington Post exposing the role
diamonds (and the diamond industry) were playing in several African civil wars.2
Amidst the growing public awareness of conflict diamonds, the United Nations
took action against Angola in 1998 and Sierra Leone in 2000, imposing sanctions on all
diamond trade with these states. Reports subsequently emerged, however, detailing how
sanctions could do little to remedy the situation if diamonds from conflict zones were
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crossing borders into non-sanctioned neighboring countries (Fowler 2000). Fearing
widespread consumer boycott, the South African government invited representatives
from other diamond producing and trading states as well as representatives from the
diamond industry and NGO’s to meet in Kimberley in May 2000. The purpose of the
meeting was to come up with the framework for an institution that could prevent the trade
of conflict diamonds. After a series of other meetings and nearly two and half years later,
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) emerged as an overarching
regulatory agreement that would oversee the international trade in rough diamonds for
Kimberley Process member states.
Seeking to regulate the trade of diamonds, the Kimberley Process incorporates a
tripartite system to ensure that diamonds being imported and exported by member
countries are conflict-free. The process engages the governments of member states
(considered “participants”) as well as the diamond industry acting through the World
Diamond Council and a number of NGO’s that play an oversight role (considered
“observers”). Initially, 37 member states plus the European Union joined the global
certification scheme with the number now totaling 54 participants representing 81
countries in 2015 (Kimberley Process 2015). Although it has been supported by the
United Nations, the KPCS itself functions independent of the body after concerns that
without autonomy the negotiations would have been slow and ineffective. This also
allows for the inclusion of industry and civil society representatives that were thought to
play a vital role in creating a successful and lasting structure.
The Kimberley Process itself is a voluntary agreement between member states, as
opposed to a formal treaty. However, because member states agree to only engage in
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diamond trade with other member states, it has in practice become as legally binding as
more traditional international law. Member states also agree to meet minimum
requirements in implementing national legislation and institutions, import, export, and
internal controls, and commit to transparency and the exchange of annual statistical data.
Specifically, each shipment of diamonds crossing an international border should be
transported in a tamper-resistant container and be accompanied by a governmentvalidated Kimberley Certificate. Each certificate must be uniquely numbered, forgery
resistant, and also provide details on the contents of the shipment including the number of
carats, value in US dollars, identification of the importer and exporter, etc. Failure to
comply with these minimum criteria may cause for the suspension or removal of a noncomplying country (Kimberley Process 2015).
Despite these praiseworthy intentions, the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process
has been called into question by numerous commentators and investigative journalists in
the years since its creation. Reports of forgery emerged in early 2012 with false
Kimberley Process certificates being issued from Cameroon, before the country had even
been accepted as a participant member. The Kimberley Process organization issued
official warnings for these illegitimate certificates plainly stating “Any document
purporting to be a Kimberley Process certificate from Cameroon is fake and should not
be used” (Ntaryike 2012). Additionally the U.S. State Department under a 2009
administrative decision collected a number of false Kimberley Process certificates that it
came across between 2004 and 2010, originating from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Namibia, and Sierra Leone (U.S. Sate Department 2011).
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While government and Kimberley Process officials have been able to spot many
forged certificates, a larger problem has been illicit diamonds smuggled across borders.
The United Nations has reported diamonds mined in rebel-controlled areas of Côte
d’Ivoire emerging on the international market (United Nations 2007), often being sold
through Mali (United Nations 2008). Liberia has also been identified as another state
where diamonds are smuggled into from Sierra Leone, the Marange field in Zimbabwe,
and the Central African Republic (Legal Monitor Worldwide 2013). Venezuela
additionally is acknowledged as a country smuggling diamonds beyond its borders while
it has been under Kimberley Process sanctions. Although Venezuela has a high level of
diamond production, it lists no official exports since 2005 (Partnership Africa Canada
2006). The application of neighboring Panama (a non-diamond producing country) to the
Kimberley Process suggests the presence of smuggled gems inside its borders (Allen
2012).
Often diamonds are smuggled after receiving a minimal number of facets,
allowing them to be considered “manufactured goods” and thus outside of the purview of
the Kimberley Process, not needing certification prior to export. A UN Panel of Exports
reported in 2013 the possibility of a manufacturing facility in Côte d’Ivoire producing
partially polished stones that created a new loophole in the Kimberley Process (United
Nations 2013). The same UN panel warned that if diamonds emerging from sanctioned
states (such as Côte d’Ivoire) or otherwise of controversial origin can be minimally
polished to fall outside the oversight of the KPCS, this is problematic.
Another loophole in the Kimberley Process that has been identified is the use of
certificates of “mixed origin”. Section I of the Kimberley Process Core Document allows

	
  

23	
  

for parcels of mixed origin, meaning a parcel that contains rough diamonds from two or
more countries of origin, mixed together. The problem with this allowance is that the
parcel of mixed origin then receives a new certificate, issued only with information for
the country where the contents were mixed. Reports and lawsuits have emerged
specifically regarding Omega Diamonds, a Belgian company that would purchase
diamonds of questionable origin for a small price tag in Angola, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, and Zimbabwe. These diamonds would then be shipped to Dubai where they
would be given a certificate of mixed origin and subsequently marketed at an over-value
price (Sharife and Grobler 2013).
Despite the incidents of diamond smuggling and forged or deceptive certificates,
many supporters of the Kimberley Process point to the limited number of actual “conflict
diamonds” on the market emerging from areas controlled by rebels in order to finance
war. However, many critics have pointed out the limited scope of the Kimberley Process
in solely focusing on the elimination of diamonds exported for the benefit of rebel
armies, despite this being the initial goal. This definition of “conflict diamonds” does not
consider other disagreeable aspects of the international diamond trade, particularly abuses
sustained at the hands of participating member governments. The system is structured to
incorporate multiple actors involved in diamond production and trade, with diamonds
producers expected to present evidence of the conflict-free gems to a government
monitoring body, and the government agency in turn confirming that this evidence is
legitimate. With this system, the Kimberley Process does not directly account for the
illegitimate acts committed by the government, or the corruption of these institutions and
the payoffs taking place in order to certify diamonds as “conflict-free”. Various other
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forms of violence, including social and financial in addition to physical, fall outside the
Kimberley definition. These include actions taken by those who control the state as well
as their corporate partners in the diamond industry.
An example of this limitation has been the 2006 discovery of diamonds in the
Marange district of Zimbabwe and the continual obstacles it has created for the
Kimberley Process. Concerns first emerged regarding the large number of unlicensed
miners and lack of regulation, also addressing the water, housing, and sanitation crisis
that emerged after the initial diamond rush. However, in 2008 government officials
deployed the Zimbabwe military to the diamond fields and stories of serious human
rights abuses developed. Illegal miners have been subject to harmful violence and even
killed at the hands of these state security forces (Partnership Africa Canada 2010). Forced
labor, including child labor, as well as torture and other inhuman treatment has also been
documented by Human Rights Watch (2009, 2010).
The Kimberley Process placed restrictive measures on Zimbabwe in 2009 over
the unsettling concerns of violence from the military-controlled zone. However, despite
protests from civil society organizations and member governments (including the United
States), the organization allowed exports to resume once again in 2011. In response to
this decision Global Witness withdrew its “observer” membership in December of that
year. While there may be less danger of diamonds funding conflict for anti-government
rebels, Global Witness vocally emphasized the likelihood that diamond revenues in
Zimbabwe were financing a ruling government that uses brutal intimidation of voters to
stay in office. Questionable mining contracts in the Marange field were granted to
several companies in Zimbabwe with known associations to senior members in Robert
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Mugabe’s Zanu PF party. Off-budget diamond revenues in Zimbabwe have even been
reported by some newspapers to be directly benefiting the Zimbabwean Central
Intelligence Organisation, the state security service that allegedly has committed acts of
violence against Mugabe’s political opponents (Global Witness 2011).
In the official press release after the decision to withdraw from the Kimberley
Process, Global Witness founder and director Charmian Gooch suggested, “We now have
to recognize that this scheme, begun with so many good intentions, has done much that is
useful but ultimately failed to deliver. It has proved beyond doubt that voluntary schemes
are not going to cut it in a multi-polar world where companies and countries compete for
mineral resources” (Global Witness 2011). Despite the many successes the KPCS has
claimed credit for, groups such as Global Witness have become highly critical of the
limited scope of the Kimberley Process, publicly noting that its narrow focus will not
continue to clean up the diamond industry without accounting for other issues such as
these described.
Although there has been vast media attention both praising and criticizing the
Kimberley Process during the twelve years since its implementation, there has been
surprisingly little scholarly attention regarding the topic. This is furthermore curious, as
there has been such controversy and little consensus in the resource curse literature. Most
of the academic work concerning the Kimberley Process is limited to studies in legal
reviews and journals, some concluding that although it is considered international soft
law by classification, the KPCS obligations function as a conventional treaty for member
states and is essentially binding in practice (Ezedeu 2014). Other studies have criticized
the weak enforcement of the Kimberley Process due to its soft law nature and contend
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that with a feeble framework merely suggesting ways for member states to conduct
investigations and punish violators, it inevitably cannot be an efficient mechanism for
preventing illicit diamond trade (Cullen 2013; Fishman 2005; Holmes 2007). Cullen
does note, however, that it has worked well with some states such as Liberia, but less
well with states with weak compliance capacity such as Côte d’Ivoire.
Besides these legal-based scholarly works, there are very few other studies that
actually evaluate the effectiveness of the Kimberley Process, with even fewer doing so
through an empirical process and certainly none with quantitative data. Wright (2004)
discusses some of the achievements and limitations of the KPCS, yet makes his
evaluations before the regulatory structure had even been in place a full two years.
Hughes (2006) offers a more extensive critique of the process, noting that the largest
roadblock is how to enforce its mechanisms and obligations on alluvial-diamond
producing countries. He describes instances of diamonds illegally crossing borders into
Ghana and the Republic of Congo as well as forged KPCS certificates. However, much of
his “analysis” does come off as anecdotal storytelling with normative suggestions for
improvement. Bieri (2010) also evaluates the Kimberley Process in her qualitative study
using content analysis of core documents, news articles, and personal interviews.
Although she presents a thorough account of the creation and implementation of the
institution, she likewise merely lists the accomplishments it has made as well as the
issues it faces, without actually analyzing if fewer conflict diamonds can be attributed to
the Kimberley Process or if it is having a decreasing impact on civil war outcomes.
It is here where this research attempts to fill a gap between the existing literature
regarding diamonds and conflict and the limited work evaluating the effectiveness of the
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Kimberley Process. It can generally be hypothesized that if diamonds are indeed having a
negative impact on civil war outcomes, then the Kimberley Process should prove to be an
obstacle for the onset and duration of civil war, if it is functioning as it has been
designed. The ensuing analysis may show that both diamond abundance and the
Kimberley Process actually play an insignificant role in determining conflict outcomes
when also controlling for other factors such as economic performance of a state, the level
of governance, and ethnic fractionalization. However, with the attention, time, and
money that has been and continues to be spent on behalf of this institution, it certainly is
a worthwhile question to be investigated and synthesized into the existing literature.
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Chapter 3
Data and Methods

An examination of the literature assessing the effectiveness of the Kimberley
Process in reducing “conflict diamonds” illuminates the lack of empirically driven
analyses necessary for this evaluation. If the Kimberley Process is functioning as it has
been designed, it should prove to be a significant obstacle for the onset and duration of
civil war. This analysis seeks to test this general hypothesis as well as the overall impact
diamond abundance has on conflict outcomes, with the specific methodology and data
collection details discussed below.
Methodology
This study will replicate many of the traditional resources and civil war
quantitative models, with new attention given to the Kimberley Process. Since the
Kimberley Process largely was instituted as a result of the civil wars in Angola and Sierra
Leone and other conflicts in diamond-rich areas in sub-Saharan Africa, this study will
focus specifically on civil war outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa between 1980 and 2010.
Reliable data on diamond production is only available beginning in 1980, justifying this
as the start of the time series. This also allows for available and reliable data for other
control variables, an issue often targeted at studies focusing on sub-Saharan Africa.
Furthermore, the Kimberley Process went into official effect for original member states
in 2003, so beginning the analysis at 1980 allows for enough variation on the Kimberley
Process variable to examine its effect before and after implementation.
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Four models will be used to examine the determinants of civil war in sub-Saharan
Africa. The first two models will use civil war onset as the dependent variable, with each
including different independent variables. Due to the dichotomous nature of civil war
onset, logistic regression is used to estimate these models.3 The units of analysis for these
models are country year. The third and fourth model will specifically examine civil war
duration, using this as the dependent variable. In a duration model, the dependent variable
captures the length of time (measured here in years) until the failure event occurs (in this
case, failure actually refers to a civil war ending). This is estimated using a parametric
Weibull regression that allows for positive, negative, or no duration dependence.4 The
Weibull model estimates the effects of the independent variables on the hazard rate of a
civil war ending. The hazard rate is analogous to probability although it does not have an
upper bound. As the hazard rate increases, the expected duration of civil war also
increases.
Variables and Measures
The dependent variable for this study is civil war, with different models
examining both war onset as well as duration, as mentioned above. Data on civil war is
gathered from the Ethnic Power Relations Project, which is based upon the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflicts Data Set (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). ACD defines armed conflict as
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The Hausman test was used to determine if the model should control for fixed or random effects.
Because the test did not find the difference between the random and fixed effects estimates to be
statistically different from zero, the random effects model is used due to its efficiency and ability to
estimate all parameters in the model. In order to control for autocorrelation that is inherent in time series,
cross-sectional data with a binary dependent variable, a counter variable for spells (peace years) and cubic
splines are used, as developed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).
4
A Weibull regression is used because the effects of the covariates were not found to be proportional
over time when running diagnostics for a Cox Hazard Model. The parametric Weibull model is appropriate
because it can be assumed that the longer civil wars go on, the more likely they will be to end. See Figure 1
for visual evidence of the increasing hazard function over time. See Fearon (2004) and Hartzell and Hoddie
(2003) for other studies using Weibull models to estimate civil war duration.	
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any armed and organized confrontation between government troops and rebel
organizations, or between army factions, that reaches an annual battle-death threshold of
25 people. Massacres and genocides are not included because the government is not
organized or armed, communal riots and pogroms are excluded because the government
is not directly involved. The Ethnic Power Relations data set is selected among other
similar projects because it codes civil wars through the year 2010, providing the most
recent data. Because the Kimberley Process only went into effect in 2003, it is imperative
that the analysis utilizes the most available data for contemporary years.
The two main explanatory variables are Diamonds and the Kimberley Process.
Data for Diamonds is gathered from the British Geological Survey and is measured in
terms of overall production (thousands of carats). For the purposes of this analysis,
overall diamond production is also logged. The Kimberley Process data is gathered from
the Kimberley Process official website and is coded as a binary variable, with 0
representing the absence of the KPCS in place that year and 1 indicating that the KPCS is
established for that country in that year. An interaction term is also included to examine
the effect of both diamonds and the Kimberley Process together (Diamonds x Kimberley
Process), which controls for states that are members of the KPCS, but participate only as
diamond importers rather than diamond producers and exporters. It can be reasonably
assumed that membership in the KPCS will have a differing impact on civil war
outcomes depending on whether the state is actually engaging in diamond production.
Models 2 and 4 also include data on the specific type of diamond production
occurring in a country, differing between primary and secondary diamond production.
These are measured as two separate binary variables, with Primary Diamond Production
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coded 1 if a country engages in the production of primary or kimberlite diamonds for a
given year, and coded as 0 if it does not. Secondary Diamond Production is likewise
coded for countries engaging in the production of secondary or alluvial diamonds. Data
on these variables is gathered from the DIADATA dataset, compiled by Gilmore et al.
(2005) and in partnership with the Peace Research Institute. The Diamonds variable
measuring production in terms of actual output (carats) is generally more preferable than
these binary variables since it accounts for greater variation between producing countries.
However, the Primary Diamond Production and Secondary Diamond Production
variables are included to also examine the hypothesized negative effect that secondary
diamonds have on civil war outcomes and the potential positive effect that primary
diamonds have. These are also included for robustness checks.
Additional control variables are selected from the existing literature concerning
diamonds and civil war. These include level of democracy, GDP per capita, GDP growth,
ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, population, and whether the state is an oil
exporter.
Democracy data is gathered from the Polity IV Project and is coded as the country
year’s Polity II score (Polity II). The measure is the difference between the country’s
AUTOC and DEMOC scores and ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly
autocratic). The literature assumes that countries with higher levels of democracy will be
less likely to experience civil war. Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data for
much of sub-Saharan Africa, Polity IV does not include information for Eritrea (19801993), Namibia (1980-1989), Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.
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Data for GDP Per Capita is from the Penn World Tables and is measured as
expenditure-side real GDP per capita at chained purchasing power parity (PPP) rates in
millions of 2005 US$. GDP Change is measured as the change in percent from the
previous year for the expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPP rates in millions of 2005
US$. Both the rebellion as greed-driven and state-capacity theories expect that civil war
will be less likely in states with higher GDP and GDP growth. GDP data is not available
for the cases of Eritrea, Seychelles, and Somalia.
Ethnic Fractionalization is coded using the Alesina et al. (2003) index of ethnic
fractionalization. The data set measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious
heterogeneity in various countries. Ethnic fractionalization is often used as a proxy
variable for grievance and to examine whether rebellion is grievance-driven. The
corresponding literature expects higher ethnic fractionalization to lead to greater
likelihood of civil war onset. The Alesina index does not include data for Cape Verde,
Eritrea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland.
Mountainous Terrain is measured as the proportion of a country that is considered
“mountainous”, as gathered by Fearon and Laitin (2003) but also according to the
codings of geographer A.J. Gerard. These authors hypothesize that mountainous terrain
will be more favorable to rebels and difficult for weak states to terminate insurrections in,
thus leading to civil war. Fearon and Laitin do not include data for Cape Verde, Comoros,
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.
Data for Population is from the Penn World Tables and is measured in millions,
as well as logged. The literature commonly cites states with higher populations being
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more likely to experience civil war. Data is not available for Eritrea, Seychelles, and
Somalia.
Data for Oil is coded as 1 if oil represents one third or more of a country’s GDP
and 0 if this threshold is not met. Data for years 1980 to 2001 is provided by Leonarda
Arriola (see Arriola 2009). Data for years 2002 to 2010 is from World Development
Indicators. The resource curse literature has generally assumed that states with an
abundance of oil will be more likely to experience civil war, yet some recent work
instead finds a stabilizing effect. Data is unavailable for Eritrea (1980-1991), Namibia
(1980-1989), Sudan (2009-2010) and Swaziland.	
  
Hypotheses
Models 1 and 2 examine the determinants of civil war onset. According to the
vast majority of the literature, diamonds should render states more likely to experience
civil war. If the Kimberley Process is effectively eliminating conflict diamonds, however,
states with the Kimberley Process in place should be less likely to experience civil war.
Hypotheses for Model 1 are as follows:
H1: States with higher diamond production will have greater likelihood of civil
war onset.
H2: The Kimberley Process will decrease the likelihood of civil war onset.
H3: The interaction of diamonds and the Kimberley Process will decrease the
likelihood of civil war onset.
Model 2 includes the additional hypotheses:
H4: States with primary diamond production will have less likelihood of civil war
onset.
H5: States with secondary diamond production will have greater likelihood of
civil war onset.
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Models 3 and 4 examine the determinants of civil war duration. Once again,
according to much of the previous research, diamond production should increase the
length of civil wars, providing a source of funding for rebel groups. However, if the
Kimberley Process is working as intended, these diamonds could not be legally traded by
member states. Rebels could not use “conflict diamonds” to continue violence against the
state. The hypotheses for Model 3 are as follows:
H6: States with higher diamond production will have longer civil wars.
H7: The Kimberley Process will decrease the length of civil wars.
H8: The interaction of diamonds and the Kimberley Process will decrease the
length of civil wars.
Model 4 includes the additional hypotheses:
H9: States with primary diamond production will have shorter civil wars.
H10: States with secondary diamond production will have longer civil wars.
The ensuing analysis tests these ten specific hypotheses in the four outlined
models. Results for assessing the impact of diamonds and the Kimberley Process on both
the onset and duration of civil war are reported in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Results

Table 1 presents the results for Models 1 and 2 examining the determinants of
civil war onset. Interestingly enough Diamonds, the Kimberley Process, nor the
Diamonds x Kimberley Process interaction has any significant effect on civil war onset,
contradicting Hypotheses 1-3. Hypotheses 4 and 5 also cannot be confirmed, with the
coefficients for primary and secondary diamonds likewise having no significant impact in
Model 2. GDP Per Capita is the only variable significantly affecting the likelihood of
civil war, with higher GDP per capita decreasing the likelihood of civil war onset. The
significance of the GDP Per Capita coefficient lends support for both the rebellion as
being greed-driven mechanism in the literature and the state capacity argument. States
with higher GDP under the greedy rebels theory will have higher opportunity costs for
engaging in civil war. The state capacity argument holds that states with greater financial
strength will be more effective at managing counterinsurgency and preventing civil wars.
Ultimately however, it is difficult to make a strong case for either of these theories based
on the analysis because of the lack of significance for the diamond variables.
The lack of significant predictors in both Models 1 and 2 is likely a result of the
very limited variance on the dependent variable, civil war onset. The dataset contains
1210 observations (country years), with 96.2 percent of these coded as 0, meaning no
onset of a new civil war. With such a limited number of actual civil war onsets, the model
simply does not have enough variance to generate any significant predictability. Further
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research may expand the dataset to include a larger case selection in order to address
this.5

Table 1
Logit Analysis of Civil War Onset
In sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-2010

Independent Variables

(1)

(2)

Diamonds

0.019
(0.028)
-4.922
(3.745)
0.335
(0.251)

0.015
(0.043)
-5.962
(3.999)
0.415
(0.271)
-0.619
(0.582)
0.375
(0.534)
0.681
(1.335)
-0.013
(0.033)
0.003
(0.009)
0.085
(0.155)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.008
(0.013)
0.167
(0.496)
-3.657
1210
16.98

Kimberley Process
Diamonds x Kimberley Process
Primary Diamond Production
Secondary Diamond Production
Ethnic Fractionalization

0.890
(1.325)
-0.007
(0.032)
0.003
(0.009)
0.027
(0.145)
-0.000*
(0.000)
0.009
(0.013)
0.322
(0.476)
-3.564
1210
15.66

Polity II
Mountainous Terrain
Population
GDP Per Capita
GDP Change
Oil
Constant
Observations
Chi-square

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2 presents the results for Models 3 and 4, examining the duration of civil
war. Given the manner in which Weibull models are parametrized, a positive coefficient
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Other models including a scobit regression were used in an endeavor to address the skewed
distribution of the dependent variable (see Nagler 1994), but none of these could converge on an
estimation, leaving the logit model as the best attempt at explaining the onset of civil war.

	
  

37	
  

estimate indicates that an independent variable increases the hazard of a civil war ending.
Since the duration of civil war is inversely related to the hazard of a civil war ending
during a given year, a positive coefficient indicates that an independent variable increases
the expected duration of civil war for a state.

Table 2
Weibull Analysis of Civil War Duration
In sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-2010

Independent Variables

Diamonds
Kimberley Process
Diamonds x Kimberley Process

(3)

(4)

0.028
(0.048)
3.305***
(1.175)
-0.164**
(0.067)

-0.027
(0.058)
3.154***
(1.274)
-0.158**
(0.074)
1.230*
(0.717)
0.345
(0.692)
0.120
(2.568)
0.024
(0.044)
-0.009
(0.018)
-0.347
(0.272)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.035*
(0.019)
-1.836
(1.477)
-1.838
178
182.24***
1.298
178
26/26

Primary Diamond Production
Secondary Diamond Production
Ethnic Fractionalization
Polity II
Mountainous Terrain
Population
GDP per capita
GDP change
Oil
Constant
Observations
Wald chi-square
P
Time at risk
Subjects/Failures

-0.103
(2.245)
0.045
(0.045)
-0.008
(0.015)
-0.157
(0.284)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.035**
(0.018)
-1.342
(1.044)
-1.671
178
157.00***
1.129
178
26/26

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note. Hazard coefficients represented in table
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2 shows the coefficients for Diamonds as statistically insignificant in both
Model 3 and Model 4, preventing Hypothesis 6 from being confirmed. The literature’s
theory of diamonds providing a “financing” mechanism thus is not supported in this
model. While the Kimberley Process variable is significant, Hypothesis 7 cannot be
confirmed, since the positive coefficient implies the variable increases the length of civil
war. However, the theoretically relevant effect is the interaction between diamond
production and the Kimberley Process, assuming KPCS members will be diamond
producing states. The coefficient for the Diamonds x Kimberley Process interaction
variable is statistically significant in the hypothesized direction, confirming Hypothesis 8.
In other words, states having greater diamond production and the Kimberley Process in
place experience shorter civil wars, as understood by the negative sign. States where the
Kimberley Process was intended to mitigate conflict (diamond producing states) are
experiencing less destructive civil war outcomes (measured here as length). According to
the estimation in this model, the Kimberley Process is indeed having its intended effect
on civil war duration for diamond producing states.
Figure 1 shows a substantive representation of the effect that the Kimberley Process
has for diamond producing countries. The graph captures the duration (measured in
years) on the x-axis and the hazard function on the y-axis. The blue curve represents a
state with the mean level of diamond production (logged = 3.72) and that does not have
the Kimberley Process in place. The red curve represents a state that also has the mean
level of diamond production, yet does have the Kimberley Process in place. The red
curve shows that at the baseline, the state with the Kimberley Process in place has a
greater hazard function than the blue curve. This means that the red curve state with the
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Kimberley Process in place, is more likely to reach the hazard (end of civil war), visually
demonstrating that states with the Kimberley Process have shorter civil wars.
Figure 1
Graph of Hazard Function (Model 3)

Model 4 (Table 2) suggests the same relationship on civil war duration for the
Diamonds, Kimberley Process, and Diamonds x Kimberley Process coefficients found in
Model 3, confirming the robustness of these results. The significance of the Primary
Diamond Production coefficient presents interesting implications regarding the
“lootability” argument found in the literature, with its lengthening effect on civil war
duration (contrary to Hypothesis 9). Additionally there is no significant impact for
Secondary Diamond Production on civil war duration, rejecting Hypothesis 10. Because
of the extensive mining infrastructure and investment that is required to harvest primary
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diamonds from kimberlite beds deep underground, the literature has generally suggested
that rebel groups are not able to use these resources as a means to continue funding armed
conflict, but could do so through the availability of secondary or alluvial diamonds.
However, the analysis in Model 4 does not support this. Perhaps the viewpoint in the
literature does not take into account potential instances where primary diamond mines
(including their infrastructure) are captured by rebel groups. A situation such as this
could possibly increase civil war duration if rebels are able to continue financing conflict
from primary diamond revenues. Furthermore, this evidence might suggest that states
with primary diamond mining also have greater resources to continue fighting civil wars.
Many countries with an abundance of kimberlite diamonds directly benefit from their
profits, having state-owned (or partially owned) extraction enterprises. The analysis
might also suggest states with primary diamond mining (that are able to retain control of
their mines during civil war) are able to continue financing the conflict through this
income, having an even greater incentive to keep control of these mines. While the
evidence from this analysis does not give empirical support for either of these
hypothesized causal mechanisms, it does question the body of literature that has shown
primary diamonds to have a stabilizing effect and secondary diamonds to lengthen civil
wars.
GDP Change also is a significant determinant of civil war duration in both
Models 3 and 4. Interestingly, the positive coefficient for GDP Change demonstrates that
higher levels of economic growth in a state increase the length of civil war. This finding
questions support for the state capacity theory of civil war, which suggests that states
with greater economic strength will have a better ability to terminate insurrections and
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manage counterinsurgency. However, perhaps once again higher levels of economic
growth simply give the state more resources to keep financing prolonged conflict.
Because of the unexpected direction of the effect of GDP Change, further research
should continue to examine the role that it plays in conflict duration.
The following chapter will go into a broader substantive discussion of these
results, as well as present limitations of this study, suggestions for further research, and
conclusions.
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Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusions

This paper proposes a quantitative model for examining the effects of the
Kimberley Process on civil war outcomes. Although there have been a number of studies
in the field of international law evaluating the structure of the Kimberley Process and
frequent normative arguments offering both criticism and acclamation for it, there has
been relatively no systematic analysis from political science scholars assessing its role in
preventing conflict. The inclusion of the Kimberley Process as an independent variable in
a relatively standard model of civil war outcomes is a simple and unsophisticated
addition, yet the results are nonetheless interesting for understanding the impact of this
international soft-law structure. While the Kimberley Process has no significant impact
on civil war onset, it does lead to shorter civil wars for the diamond producing states
where it was intended to ameliorate conflict outcomes. This suggests that when civil wars
do break out in diamond producing states that are members of the Kimberley Process,
rebels are not able to use diamonds as a source of revenue to keep funding conflict.
The analysis also challenges the conventional wisdom for the determinants of
civil war onset. Much of the literature has found support for the included control
variables in Models 1 and 2. As previously discussed, perhaps a reason for the lack of
significant predictors (besides GDP per capita) is the limited number of years in this case
selection and thus limited variance on the dependent variable, as compared to many civil
war studies using time-series data beginning much earlier in the 20th century. The
insignificance of the diamond variables in both models, as well as the parceled out
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primary and secondary diamond variables in Model 2 certainly are at odds with much of
the literature regarding diamonds and conflict (Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005;
Østby, Nordås, and Rød. 2009; Ross 2006). The quality of data regarding total diamond
production has greatly improved in recent years, with some credit to be given to the
Kimberley Process’s requirement for member states to provide this detailed information.
Further research using total diamond production as well as the formerly used binary
variables indicating diamond presence or production will continue to illuminate the
relationship between diamond abundance and civil war.
The duration models in this study also question the effect that diamonds are
actually having on civil war outcomes. The lack of a significant effect for overall
diamond production and secondary diamonds, as well as the increasing effect of primary
diamonds prompts further review of the body of research that has found diamonds to be
having an impact on conflict duration (Buhaug and Lujala 2005; Lujala 2009, 2010). As
with the onset models, further research using improved diamond data should be pursued
to understand the role that diamonds have on civil war duration.
The significant decreasing impact on civil war duration for states having greater
diamond production and the Kimberley Process in place provides strong empirical
support for the international soft-law structure, despite many of the criticisms described
in Chapter 2. Perhaps, however, these limitations should still be given consideration, with
the Kimberley Process having no measurable effect on civil war onset. Many of the
issues such as forged certificates and smuggled gems remain troubling, even in light of
the analysis results in Models 3 and 4. Yet supporters of the Kimberley Process can be
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somewhat validated by these results, allowing them to suggest that the Kimberley Process
is indeed preventing rebel groups from financing conflict through “blood diamonds”.
This also suggests broader implications for the role that institutions might have in
addressing societal and economic problems, such as other aspects of the “resource curse”.
The Kimberley Process was designed as an institution to stop the trade of diamonds that
indirectly fund conflict, and the evidence presented in this study shows that it has been
somewhat successful. This information may be valuable for further policymaking and
peacekeeping efforts that use institutions to address problems such as conflict. Civil
society organizations have called for the creation of structures similar to the KPCS to
regulate the illicit trade of other resources such as timber and cocoa (see Global Witness
2015). The effectiveness of the Kimberley Process may impact the potential future of
these other regulatory institutions and how they are designed.
As is inherent in any quantitative analysis focused on sub-Saharan Africa, this
study could be biased by unreliable data for many of the variables, especially for
diamond production data. The onset analysis in Models 1 and 2 could be biased by the
limited case selection of 1980-2010. Extending the dataset earlier could allow for more
variation on the dependent variable (civil war onset), although both the availability and
reliability of data might then be compromised.
Beyond the reach of this study, further research might explore the effect that
governance and corruption have on civil war outcomes for diamond producing states,
seeking to better understand cases such as Zimbabwe. This could also allow for greater
consideration of the autocratic regime aspect of the resource curse that has also been
identified. Perhaps using a different measure for conflict that captures unilateral state-
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sponsored violence and oppression might further illuminate the potential negative effects
diamond abundance might have, looking beyond the two-sided conflicts examined in this
study.
While unrelated to conflict, future studies might also examine the impact that the
Kimberley Process has had on small-scale artisanal miners in order to better understand
the more general effects of the organization. Navigating the government bureaucracy that
is necessary to obtain a Kimberley Process certificate may be creating obstacles for
miners with little formal education or familiarity with such tasks. Measures have been
taken by the Kimberley Process and civil society organizations to aid alluvial miners in
these procedures, yet the impact it has had on this group and their livelihood is likewise
given little attention in the literature.
The Kimberley Process can certainly be esteemed for the measures that it has
taken to increase transparency in international diamond trade and reduce the number of
conflict diamonds on hands of consumers. Yet there is still much to be understood
regarding the effectiveness of the institution, especially in terms of actual conflict
outcomes. This study takes a step towards that direction, with its systematic analysis
offering more insight than the various commentaries and criticisms that can be found
regarding the KPCS. While considerable further scholarship and attention is necessary to
make any concrete claims, this study does give some empirical backing for the many
supporters of the Kimberley Process, 12 years after its initial praiseworthy intentions
were set into action.
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